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NOTE
Leaving a Stone Unturned - The Unanswered
Question from Green Tree Finanical Corp.
v. Bazzle: Does the Federal Arbitration
Act Permit Classwide Arbitration?
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate America is increasingly relying on adhesive contracts to
procure mandatory binding arbitration.1 Among the principal reasons
that Corporate America has chosen to take this route is the perception
that the arbitral process facilitates an economical disposition of conflicts
which is advanced by the accompanying belief that arbitration awards
are usually more rational than jury verdicts.2 In addition to the afore-
mentioned reasons for potential corporate defendants to impose
mandatory arbitration on consumers, employees, and others, the utility
of arbitration as a shield to the dreaded class action effectively elimi-
nates the threat of a class action and thereby acts as a highly effective
risk management tool.3 As one commentator has observed, potential
corporate defendants are increasingly drafting arbitration clauses that
explicitly bar class action proceedings in an effort to secure favorable
court rulings.4 Consequently, modem arbitration clauses repeatedly
1. See, e.g., Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1999) (stating that there has been an "explosive expansion" in the use of arbitration
clauses in contracts of adhesion); Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action
Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 142 (1997); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But
Who's the Predator?: Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, Bus. L. TODAY, May-
June 1998, at 24; Steven M. Guttell, Note, An Analysis of a Technique of Dispute Settlement: The
Expanding Role of Arbitration, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 618, 634-35 (1973).
2. Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L.
REV. 787 (1981) [hereinafter Quagmire].
3. With the Supreme Court's ruling in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489
U.S. 468 (1989), propounding that the primary purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1994), is to enforce arbitration agreements as they are written, potential
defendants can presumably guarantee that they will not be subject to class actions if they include
such a clause in their arbitration agreements. See also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
4. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695
(finding that sixteen of thirty-four arbitration clauses examined in a survey of clauses imposed by
franchisors on franchisees prohibited class action proceedings in arbitration).
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enable corporate defendants to disrupt or disallow attempts by consum-
ers and others to vindicate their rights through class-wide claims.5
Despite the fact that the enforceability of arbitration clauses explic-
itly prohibiting class actions "is currently one of the hottest issues in
arbitration,"6 the United States Supreme Court failed to seize the oppor-
tunity provided in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle7 to address the
mounting concern that corporations are using arbitration clauses as a
"stealth weapon or Trojan horse" to surreptitiously defeat the class
action as a legal remedy.8 In Bazzle, the Court was able to avoid the
pertinent issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")9 permits
class arbitration in agreements that are silent on the matter by holding
that the question is a matter of state law contract interpretation and is
therefore a question for the arbitrator to decide. 10 Respondents Lynn
and Burt Bazzle, Daniel Lackey, and George and Florine Buggs sepa-
rately entered into loan contracts with the petitioner, Green Tree Finan-
cial Corporation, a financing company." The Supreme Court of South
Carolina later consolidated the respondents' claims.12 Each of the
respondent's agreements contained a similar arbitration clause' 3 that was
5. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Qasim, No. 99-9434, 2000 WL 1210868 (2d Cir. Aug.
23, 2000) (affirming the grant of an injunction prohibiting participation in a class action in
contravention of an arbitration agreement); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp.
77 (D. Conn. 1996) (enjoining state court class action in its entirety pending resolution of
individual arbitrations).
6. Richard T. Seymour, Current Developments in Employment Law: Recent Developments
in Arbitration 1355, 1370 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 24-26, 2003), available in Westlaw
SJ012 ALI-ABA 1355.
7. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
8. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 125.
9. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
10. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453-54.
11. Id. at 447-48.
12. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002).
13. The text of the Bazzles' actual agreement, in pertinent part, is as follows:
ARBITRATION - All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to
this contract or the relationships which result from this contract... shall be resolved
by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This
arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and
shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1.... THE
PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY
HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER
THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION BY U.S. (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN) .... The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all
powers provided by the law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal
and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added by the Court, capitalization in original). The majority
opinion stated that Lackey's and the Buggs' arbitration clauses were identical to the Bazzles' "in
all relevant respects." Id.
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silent as to whether class arbitration was permissible. At the time the
loan transactions were executed, "Green Tree apparently failed to pro-
vide [the respondents] with a legally required form" 4 that would have
informed them of their "right to name their own lawyers and insurance
agents."' 5
All of the respondents filed separate actions in the South Carolina
state courts seeking certification of their claims as class actions to which
Green Tree responded by attempting to stay the court proceedings and
compel arbitration.16 In January of 1998, the court handling the Baz-
zles' claim "(1) certified a class action and (2) entered an order compel-
ling arbitration."' 7 After the selection of an arbitrator by Green Tree
with the consent of the Bazzles, the claim proceeded to arbitration where
the arbitrator administered the proceeding as a class arbitration and
awarded the class $10,935,000 in statutory damages and attorney's
fees. 18
As the Buggs' and Lackey's had also sought class certification,
their case progressed in a similar fashion.1 9 Coincidentally the parties
chose the same arbitrator that had presided in the Bazzles' claim. 20 The
arbitrator again certified an arbitral, heard the matter, and in ruling for
the class, awarded $9,200,000 in statutory damages and attorney's
fees.21 In both matters, Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina
Court of Appeals alleging, "among other things, that class arbitration
was legally impermissible. 22 After consolidation of the claims,23 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreements were
silent with respect to class arbitration, that they therefore authorized
class arbitration, and that the resulting class arbitration proceedings and
awards were proper.24
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle is less
important for what questions it answers than it is for the question that it
leaves unanswered: does the FAA permit class arbitration? This note
first addresses the history of the FAA, and then proceeds to discuss the
substantial change in the law created by Bazzle, as well as the backdrop
of arbitration law upon which that decision relies. Thus, the aforemen-
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-102 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
15. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 448.







23. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002).
24. Id. at 263-68.
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tioned analysis evolves as the Bazzle decision leaves one stone unturned
in terms of the FAA's stance on class arbitration.
II. THE HYBRID OF CLASS-WIDE ARBITRATION
Any discussion or critique of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Baz-
zle25 must begin with the law and policy underlying the decision. In the
following paragraphs, as a prelude to the analysis of the Supreme
Court's opinion, the law governing both class actions and arbitrations is
discussed, as are the purported virtues and pitfalls of the hybrid known
as class-wide arbitration.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Arbitration is a mechanism of alternative dispute resolution2 6 by
which parties contract "to submit a present or future dispute to private
individuals" for resolution.27 A primary goal of the FAA is to "move
the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible. '2 8 Originally passed in 1925, the FAA
was reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title IX of the United States
code. 29 The FAA was enacted to "reverse the longstanding judicial hos-
tility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law
and had been adopted by American courts," and also to "place arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."30
In 1984, the Supreme Court gave new life to the FAA by holding
that its application extended to state as well as federal courts.3" In addi-
tion to its dual application, the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed
that enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms is the pri-
mary focus of the FAA.3 2 Since these observations were made by the
Supreme Court, the problem of which "gateway issues," such as whether
a particular agreement allows for class arbitration, are for the court to
25. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
26. Negotiation, mediation, and litigation fall among other methods of dispute resolution. See
generally Note, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial Role, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1218
(1968).
27. See Quagmire, supra note 2, at 792-93.
28. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
29. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 644-74 (1996) (tracing the
development of the FAA from its inception through 1996).
30. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
510 n.4 (1974)).
31. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
32. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989); Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 1.
[Vol. 59:413
LEAVING A STONE UNTURNED
decide, and which issues are for the arbitrator to decide has become
increasingly important.33 After these developments, mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses have become commonplace in consumer contracts.34 When
those contracts were silent as to the availability of class arbitration, the
clear weight of federal authority held that such arbitration was imper-
missible.3 ' Thus, under the prevailing interpretation of the FAA, there
can be no consolidated or class action arbitration without the express
consent of the parties. 36 Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in
Bazzle avoiding that authority, is best understood in light of the law and
policies behind both class actions and arbitration.
B. Law and Policy Behind Class Actions
The class action is a procedural device by which a single party or a
small number of litigants "represent a larger group of parties that share a
common interest in dispute."37  Modem class action jurisprudence is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, which was
enacted in 1937.38 The class action device is used when, "because of the
[sheer] size of the class, joinder of all of the coparties would be imprac-
tical or when, because of venue or service of process limitations, joinder
would be impossible. 39 Class action judgments are binding on all
members of the class as defined by the court, regardless of whether they
participated in the litigation.4 °
In order to achieve certification as a class representative, one must
demonstrate that the class and its chosen representatives in the litigation
33. See generally IAN R. MAcNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS,
AWARDS & REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT §§ 15.1.4 to 15.3.7, at 15:12 to
15:48 (1994).
34. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831, 834-35 (2002); Drahozal, supra note 4.
35. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. W.
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377-78 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001);
Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.P.A. v. MIV Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 481-82 (4th Cir.
1999); Gov't of United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F. 2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial
Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991), affg, 761 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1991);
Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Del
E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1987); Baesler v. Cont'l
Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743
F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
36. See, e.g., Champ, 55 F.3d at 274-77; Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377 n.4; Deiulemar, 198 F.3d
at 481-82; Boeing, 998 F. 2d at 74.
37. See Quagmire, supra note 2, at 787.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966
amendments).
39. See Quagmire, supra note 2, at 787.
40. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85
cmt. e (1982). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 981-98 (5th ed. 2000).
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meet each of the four requirements laid out in Rule 23(a): numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 4 Addition-
ally, the class action must fall into one of the three categorical situations
described in Rule 23(b): the class action would avoid varying adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class, 42 the action seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief where the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on "grounds generally applicable to the class,"4 3
or that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate, vo that
the class action is a superior method for fairly adjudicating the issues
involved.44
Both policy and history extol the virtues and justifications of the
class action device. Efficiency ,4 improving access to the litigation sys-
tem, especially for those whose individual claims are too small to war-
rant the time and expense involved in an individual suit,46 and serving
the public interest,47 are all attributes of the class action that underlie its
utility. Without the class action as a mechanism for the enforcement of
public rights, school desegregation, 4 8 rampant consumer fraud,49 and the
mistreatment of prisoners50 might still be keynote issues in our society.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); YEAZELL, supra note 40, at 964.
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1); YEAZELL, supra note 40, at 965; see also Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (observing that Rule 23(b)(1) class actions are
appropriate where individual actions would risk "'incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class'") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. (b)(l)(A)).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); YEAZELL, supra note 40, at 966.
44. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3); YEAZELL, supra note 40, at 966.
45. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (advocating that a
goal of the class action is to permit litigation "of a suit involving common questions when there
are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder"); Note, Bruce I. Bertelsen et al., The Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1138-41 (1974); see also Amchem, 521 U.S.
at 617-18 (observing that class actions allow numerous parties with similar claims to avoid
lengthy individual proceedings and obtain a speedy adjudication in accordance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 1); Note, Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1321,
1321-22 (1976).
46. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809 (suggesting that the virtues of the class action
include pooling claims that are uneconomical to litigate individually).
47. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514 (1996)
(arguing that the class action is an effective device for enforcing the law and deterring wrongful
conduct).
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding, in a class action suit, that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits school segregation); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(affirming award of permanent injunction prohibiting the exclusion of illegal immigrant children
from Texas public school district).
49. See Youngberg v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, No. 96-16497, 1997 WL
419113 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing class action brought against bank for overcharge of fees);
James E. Starts, The Consumer Class Action - Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L.
REv. 407 (1969) (arguing that class actions are an effective mechanism for the vindication of
consumer's rights).
50. See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (granting class certification to
prisoners alleging unconstitutional conditions at prison); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
[Vol. 59:413
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In sum, although the class action has its critics,5 ' its importance as a
device by which similar claims are presented and resolved in one adjudi-
cation is invaluable as it promotes* efficiency, consistency, and liberal
access to federal courts.
C. Law and Policy Behind Arbitration
Proponents of arbitration have long espoused the idea that, as a
dispute resolution mechanism, arbitration is quicker,52 cheaper,53 and
easier than litigation.54 Further, the additional benefits of allowing par-
ties to contract for their arbitrator, keep proceedings relatively confiden-
tial,55 as well as relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules 56 help assure
that the manner in which the contracting parties' disputes are resolved
will be tailored to their wishes, thereby promoting the preservation of
goodwill between the parties.57 One of the most avid supporters of arbi-
tration as a favored method of dispute resolution is the United States
Supreme Court.58
1968) (granting class certification to prisoners seeking injunctive relief as to certain types of
discipline).
51. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167-70 (1997) (analyzing situations where attorneys are paid large
sums of money while members of the class action receive next to nothing).
52. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (3d ed. 1999); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 850 (1961).
53. Although cost savings through the use of arbitration rather than litigation is a matter still
in dispute, many proponents of arbitration cite lower expenses as a substantial reason why
arbitration is preferable to litigation. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 148-52 (1992)
(noting that cost savings is one reason that the diamond industry prefers private dispute resolution
to litigation).
54. See generally Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985
at 3, 6.
55. Arbitration proceedings are designed to be private, and the information revealed within is
subject to restrictions on its dissemination. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Introduction (2003) (stating that arbitration is an effective way
to resolve disputes privately).
56. Rules of procedure and evidence do not constrain arbitration proceedings. See Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 n.4 (1956).
57. Arbitration is typically a less adversarial proceeding than litigation and may preserve the
parties' business relationship. See Note, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A
Changing Attitude, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 521, 542-43 (1963).
58. By stating that the purpose of the FAA was to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements," the Supreme Court radically departed from its initial reluctance to
allow the arbitration of all individual claims. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 24 (1991); see also Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the
Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1572, 1574-75 (2000).
The Court reinforced its support of arbitration by unequivocally stating that the Federal
Arbitration Act manifests a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). For a thorough discussion
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However, arbitration is not without its critics. The ad hoc nature of
arbitration, coupled with its disregard for formality in the form of proce-
dural and evidentiary rules, may result in an unpredictable outcome,
which in turn could lead to unstable commercial relationships. 59 The
Supreme Court itself has recognized that its liberal policy favoring arbi-
tration6" is not without limitations. Examples of such limitations include
refusal of the Court to enforce ambiguous arbitration agreements,61 and
reluctance to mandate the arbitration of individual statutory claims.6" In
addition, the Supreme Court has observed that because arbitration is a
creature of contract, it is improper to force parties to arbitrate claims
where they have not agreed to do SO.
6 3
Although the Supreme Court has placed the aforementioned limits,
among others, on its favoritism of arbitration, its support of arbitration
as an effective alternative to litigation remains strong. It is this support
that has laid the groundwork for the proliferation of binding arbitration
agreements limiting parties' abilities to vindicate their rights using the
class action mechanism.
D. Combining the Class Action with Arbitration
The coupling of the class action device with an arbitral proceeding
to form a hybrid "class-wide arbitration" may be seen favorably in terms
of combining the virtues present in each individual mechanism. How-
ever, courts, scholars, and participants differ immensely with regard to
the desirability and feasibility of such a hybrid.6 4 On the other hand,
without such a hybrid, there are really only two feasible alternatives that
currently exist: allowing the elimination of the class action remedy via
binding arbitration agreements or solely permitting class actions to pro-
tracing the attitude of the Supreme Court toward arbitration, see Sternlight, supra note 29, at 644-
74.
59. See Quagmire, supra note 2, at 795.
60. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
61. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) (holding an arbitration
agreement unenforceable because of a lack of a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of the plaintiff's
right to a judicial forum).
62. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Moore, supra note 58, at
1574-83 (discussing the courts' displeasure with the use of arbitration as a means to resolve
statutory disputes).
63. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-64 (1995)
(recognizing that because arbitration is a matter of choice, it is up to the parties to choose whether
punitive damages are available); First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (holding
that parties can choose whether a court or an arbitrator will determine arbitrability); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (observing that arbitration under the FAA is a
"matter of consent, not coercion").
64. See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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ceed in the judicial forum.65
Before entering into the quagmire of the debate surrounding the
appropriateness of classwide arbitration, it is prudent to first examine the
alleged virtues and shortcomings of such a hybrid dispute resolution
mechanism. As a preliminary consideration, arbitration is essentially a
contractual matter66 whereby parties provide their own device by which
their disputes are to be resolved. On the other hand, class action suits, as
mentioned above, are formal adjudications involving intense judicial
scrutiny.67 How and whether the two should dovetail is the subject of
much debate.
1. ALLEGED VIRTUES OF CLASS-WIDE ARBITRATION
In Keating v. Superior Court,68 a California Court of Appeals con-
cluded that there were "no insurmountable obstacle[s]" to conducting
classwide arbitration.69 The California court is not alone in its deference
to classwide arbitration as a dispute resolution device, as several courts
and scholars have suggested that such a hybrid is not only workable,7"
but could effectively preserve the benefits of both the class action and
arbitration.7' This is, of course, subject to the court ruling on major
class action issues.72
In permitting classwide arbitration, both the courts in Keating7 3 and
Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. ,7 insisted that the trial court
would take a very active role in the resolution of the class action issues.
65. See Stemlight, supra note 3, at 37.
66. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (stating
in no uncertain terms that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit").
67. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
68. Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the trial
court erred by failing to first consider class action issues before sending the dispute to arbitration
in a franchisor/franchisee relationship), vacated, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), and rev'd on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
69. Id. at 492. The court went on to state that "[iun an appropriate case, [a classwide
arbitration] procedure undoubtedly would be the fairest and most efficient way of resolving the
parties' dispute." Id.
70. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982).
71. See Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (praising
both class actions and arbitration and stressing that arbitration is "a mutually advantageous
process, providing for resolution of disputes in a presumptively less costly, more expeditious, and
more private manner by an impartial person or persons typically selected by the parties
themselves") (quoting Keating, 645 P.2d at 1198).
72. See Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration & 1OB-5 Claims in the Wake of
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 403-05 (1989)
(advocating classwide arbitration in the securities industry as long as the court made the initial
certification of the class).
73. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
74. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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Specifically, the court's responsibilities would extend to certifying the
class in compliance with the relevant rules of procedure, ensuring proper
notice is provided to all class members, selecting arbitrators, dealing
with any potential conflicts of interest between representatives of the
class, and reviewing any proposed settlement.75 Beyond any of the spe-
cific issues, the Keating court stated that judicial involvement may be
necessary to protect the rights of any absent class members.76
Heightened judicial involvement, though it may seem necessary, is
not advocated by all of those in favor of classwide arbitration. One
commentator advocates that the court should limit its involvement in
classwide arbitration to reviewing the arbitration following its conclu-
sion.77 The commentator suggests that any determination regarding the
certification of a classwide arbitration should be made by an arbitrator
and that any abuses of the system can be dealt with by arbitrators as
effectively as they could be dealt with by a court.
78
In essence, viewpoints differ sharply with regard to the handling
and the mere allowance of classwide arbitrations. However, as the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated in Keating, "[i]f the alternative in a case of
this sort is to force hundreds of individual franchisees each to litigate its
cause with Southland in a separate arbitral forum, then the prospect of
classwide arbitration, for all its difficulties, may offer a better, more effi-
cient, and fairer solution."7 9 Combining the traditional class action with
arbitration offers an opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of
each device in a single proceeding.80 Thus, although the hybrid class-
wide arbitration may be difficult to work, and may in some cases face
disagreement as to its management, its benefits may outweigh its
shortcomings.
2. ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS OF CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
In spite of the aforementioned virtues of classwide arbitration, the
hybrid mechanism has not been widely adopted nor for that matter,
praised. In fact, the entire securities industry has rejected classwide
75. See id. at 866.
76. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
77. See Quagmire, supra note 2, at 806-09.
78. See id. at 811.
79. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
80. As long as the arbitrator controls the certification of the class, his independence from the
judiciary will not be compromised and the traditional advantages sought by those who initially
agreed to arbitration, most likely speed and efficiency, will be preserved. This, of course,
comports with Volt's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1994), wherein its purpose is to enforce arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms.
Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.8' Additionally, commen-
tators and several judges have suggested that the hybrid is inherently
defective in that it violates due process.
82
A major theme running through contemporary Supreme Court class
action jurisprudence is the fact that the class action, as a dispute resolu-
tion device, raises several due process concerns. 83 The most serious of
these due process hurdles is the fact that a judgment or settlement in a
class action procedure cannot be binding on absent class members unless
they were afforded adequate representation.84 In order for these hurdles
to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner, some commentators suggest
that due process concerns require substantial court oversight of all class-
wide arbitration, despite any adverse logistical consequences.8 It is
these due process concerns and hurdles that in turn, critics argue, make
classwide arbitration logistically flawed as well.
However, it is not merely due process concerns that supposedly
cause classwide arbitration problems, but rather other less obvious
problems. Jean Sternlight suggests that the simple selection of an arbi-
81. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions from
Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659 (Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers Nov. 4, 1992). The
order provides that claims filed in arbitration as class actions are not eligible for submission under
the Uniform Code of Arbitration and that claims filed by members of a putative or certified class
that were filed in another forum are also ineligible for submission if the claim is encompassed by
the class action, thereby eliminating any right to classwide arbitration in the securities industry.
82. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1210-18 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting); Harris v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 77-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (Bloom, J.
dissenting); Dunham, supra note 1; Elizabeth P. Allor, Note, Keating v. Superior Court:
Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1239 (1983).
83. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (finding that "[i]f the
forum State wishes to bind an absent [class-action] plaintiff . . . it must provide minimal
procedural due process protection"); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (finding
that the Rule 23(c) notice requirement satisfies the due process requirement of notice, and that the
costs of such notice are to be borne by the representative parties, regardless of their amount);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (holding that adequate representation is required to bind a
non-representative party to a judgment in a class action suit). See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort
Litigation, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 871 (1995) (suggesting alternative due process safeguards for
plaintiffs involved in mandatory class actions).
84. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811-12; Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42-45. See generally
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
85. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (suggesting that a determination of
class certification can only be made following an in-depth analysis of Rule 23's required
components); Quagmire, supra note 2, at 800-04 (noting that due process concerns in classwide
arbitration will likely be addressed by courts on a case-by-case basis, thereby only requiring
substantial judicial oversight in cases where procedural safeguards have not already been
instituted either privately in the arbitration agreement or by the arbitrator); see also Keating, 645
P.2d at 1215 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that before certifying a class
proceeding, "a court must carefully evaluate the nature of the proof that will be presented by the
parties, and the parties are likely to devote extensive resources to developing the facts and
arguments fully in regard to the usually complex certification issues") (citations omitted).
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trator to handle classwide arbitration can prove problematic.86 Ster-
nlight contrasts the advantages present in an individual arbitration where
all parties have the opportunity to participate in the selection of an arbi-
trator or a panel of arbitrators with the lack of availability of such partic-
ipation in classwide arbitration, as the arbitrators would presumably be
chosen by the representative parties or by counsel.87 Such a system
removes the alleged virtue of participation in the selection of the deci-
sion-maker to govern your dispute, thereby creating a logistical problem
with the classwide arbitration hybrid.
Criticism is also leveled at the classwide arbitration hybrid pro-
ceeding in general. Arguments abound for the proposition that the
hybrid procedure will become awkward and inefficient in light of the
necessity for substantial judicial supervision.88 Such considerable super-
vision might then remove the virtue of efficiency from the arbitration
process and impose a substantially similar burden on the arbitrator(s) as
that which might have been placed on the court had the class proceeding
been filed there.89 Regardless of the side taken, one must be sure that
any classwide arbitration complies with all due process requirements.
III. THE BAZZLE DECISION - LEAVING A STONE UNTURNED
The real impact of Bazzle lies in the question it failed to answer, not
in the questions that it took up. The failure of the fractured Court to
address the impact of the FAA90 on classwide arbitration has left a
troubling void in contemporary arbitration jurisprudence. Specifically,
by avoiding the aforementioned issue, the Court has prolonged a deci-
sion on the issue that has attracted the most attention from the business
community and consumer advocacy groups: does the FAA enable courts
to declare an arbitration clause that specifically prohibits classwide arbi-
tration unconscionable and unenforceable as a matter of state contract
law? 91
86. Stemlight, supra note 3, at 49.
87. Id.
88. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1215-16 (Richardson, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that
continued judicial monitoring of classwide arbitration procedures would make the ensuing
arbitration inefficient and lengthy, as well as impose a higher degree of formality than would be
customarily required, thereby making the "imposition of class action procedures on the arbitration
process . . . self-defeating"); Allor, supra note 82, at 1252-53 (arguing that arbitration on a
classwide basis would likely lose any efficiency or expense advantage due to the substantial
supervision required of a judge in such a proceeding).
89. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. But see supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
90. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
91. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at *4-5, n.2, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 538 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02-
634) (noting a recent decision which held an arbitration clause that forbid proceeding in a
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Unfortunately, by avoiding the pertinent question, the Court has
failed to take a much needed step toward solidifying how the FAA treats
classwide arbitration, and more importantly, the individual's right to
pursue classwide relief. In as much as the opinions in Bazzle send any
signals regarding how this question will ultimately be decided, they are
troubling at best. With regards to the choice to recognize strict enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements over adherence to state contract law,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggests that he and at least two other
Justices might be willing to grant the FAA a preemptive effect beyond
the statute's plain language. When the court is eventually faced with the
question it so skillfully avoided in Bazzle, it should deny corporate
America the chance to eliminate the class action as a dispute resolution
mechanism and hold that reasonable state law decisions holding clauses
prohibiting classwide arbitration unconscionable do not conflict with the
FAA.
A. Contemporary Classwide Arbitration Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether arbitra-
tions may take the form of class actions, but in dicta, has suggested that
such a proceeding may be allowable under the FAA.92 In Gilner, the
Court addressed whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 93 could "be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursu-
ant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application." '94
Gilmer opposed having his suit sent to arbitration partly on the ground
that he would be deprived of the opportunity to proceed by class
action.95 Without addressing classwide arbitration, the Court denied
Gilmer's argument, but in so doing, the Court suggested that a coupling
of class actions and arbitration would not necessarily be inappropriate.96
The Court went on to explain that arbitrators may possess the necessary
authority to allow classwide arbitration under the New York Stock
Exchange rules, and that the arbitration agreement at issue would not
prohibit the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from bringing
classwide manner unconscionable and arguing that the Bazzle case before the Court was an
opportunity to dispatch that "shibboleth"), available at 2003 WL 721691; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in Support of Respondents at *18-25, Bazzle, 538 U.S. at 444
(No. 02-634) (urging the Court not to reach the question of whether the FAA enables courts to
declare an arbitration clause that specifically prohibits classwide arbitration unconscionable and
unenforceable as a matter of state contract law), available at 2003 WL 1701520.
92. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
93. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
94. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
95. Id. at 32.
96. See id.
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an action seeking classwide relief.97 In essence, although Gilmer does
not specifically address the availability of classwide arbitration, it sug-
gests that such availability may hinge upon the language in which the
arbitration clause is drafted and the law under which the claim is
brought.
After Gilmer, but before the Court's decision in Bazzle, whether,
under the FAA, a class or consolidated arbitration was available
appeared to be an issue for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide. Further,
the clear weight of federal authority held that absent an express agree-
ment of the parties, there simply could not be classwide arbitration.98
The leading case on the issue is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Champ
v. Siegel Trading Co.," wherein an investor sued a brokerage firm in
federal court, alleging several statutory violations. The defendants in the
case moved to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, and the
motion was granted by the district court.' °° The plaintiff then sought
certification as a class representative in the arbitration, which was
denied by the district court. 1' The court concluded that because the
arbitration agreement did not specifically authorize a class proceeding, it
lacked the necessary authority to certify the class arbitration.0 2
On appeal, the central question posed to the Seventh Circuit was
whether the district court had the authority to certify a class where the
arbitration clause was silent on the issue.0 3 The Seventh Circuit
answered the question emphatically in the negative, reasoning that "sev-
eral other circuits have addressed whether a district court has the author-
ity to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and order consolidated arbitration
where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter."'" The
court went on to note a plethora of federal appellate cases0 5 holding that
absent an express provision in the parties' agreement, consolidation of
arbitral proceedings is prohibited even when such consolidation "would
promote the expeditious resolution of related claims."'1 6 However,
97. See id.
98. See supra note 36.
99. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 274.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 274-75 (citing Gov't of United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d
Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v.
Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Del E. Webb Constr. v.
Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984)).
106. See Champ, 55 F.3d at 274.
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Champ may not be the final word on the subject, even in the Seventh
Circuit, as it has recently limited its holding in Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 7 finding that an ambiguous contract
silent on the issue of classwide arbitration could reasonably be inter-
preted to allow consolidated claims."°8
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in coming to the realization that a
court may order classwide arbitration if the agreement is silent on the
issue. The seminal case in this regard is Keating v. Superior Court,1 09
where the California Supreme Court promulgated a balancing test for
application by trial courts in determining whether to permit classwide
arbitration. 10 The court's reasoning was based largely on policy argu-
ments commonly used to support class actions, 1 ' as well as arbitra-
tion,"l' and favoring the protection of weaker parties." 3  This
acquiescence toward possible classwide arbitration, where the arbitration
agreement was silent on the issue, seemingly laid groundwork argu-
ments' 14 upon which the United States Supreme Court could have relied
in allowing for classwide arbitration under the FAA.
B. Leaving A Stone Unturned
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
South Carolina Supreme Court's holding, that the arbitration agreements
in question were silent with respect to class arbitration and therefore
107. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 210 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2000).
108. See id. at 774-76.
109. Keating v, Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
110. The balancing test is a weighing of the administrative costs and complexities of necessary
court involvement in the arbitral process with the likely costs and unfairness that may occur if
classwide arbitration were denied. See id. at 1209-10. The Keating court also stated that the trial
court should consider other alternatives, such as the consolidation of individual claims. Id. at
1210. For a discussion of the necessary court involvement in classwide arbitration, see supra
notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
11l. In stating "[w]e have observed that the class suit 'both eliminates the possibility of
repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims
which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation,"' the court stressed the role
of the class action in the vindication of rights that might not be feasibly asserted otherwise. Id. at
1206 (quoting Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1981)).
112. The court decided that forbidding companies from using contracts of adhesion to
eliminate class actions should be avoided in light of the public policies favoring arbitration. See
id. at 1206-07.
113. The court voiced its concern in allowing companies to impose adhesive contracts on
consumers to effectively eliminate any classwide remedy in arbitration. Id. at 1207. Specifically,
the court said, "[i]f... an arbitration clause may be used to insulate the drafter of an adhesive
contract from any form of class proceeding, effectively foreclosing many individual claims, it may
well be oppressive and may defeat the expectations of the nondrafting party." Id.
114. The Keating court expressed considerable concern that corporate America, by drafting
adhesive arbitration agreements barring class actions, might legally be able to chill "the effective
protection of interests common to a group." Id.
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authorized class arbitration, was consistent with the FAA.' 15 They never
reached that question. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Breyer
and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg, held that whether
the parties' agreement permitted class arbitration was a matter for the
arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. 16 The opinion begins by observing
that if the arbitration clause expressly forbade classwide arbitration, then
the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding would have been "flawed
on its own terms."'117 After noting that the agreement was ambiguous on
its face, the court refused to answer whether the specific clause permit-
ted class arbitration." 8 It is this particular question, ignored by the
Supreme Court, which has left a gaping hole in arbitration law and
should have been addressed here.
Though many courts have held that due to the FAA's mandate of
enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms 1 9 they may
not compel, or perhaps even allow arbitration on a classwide basis, their
analysis of the issue leaves much to be desired as many "have simply
assumed that a silent arbitration agreement should be interpreted to fore-
close arbitral class actions."12 To the extent that courts have attempted
to address whether silent agreements allow for class actions, they have
done so by analogizing classwide arbitration with consolidation of two
or more arbitration proceedings.' 2 ' This proves problematic for several
reasons;' 22 however, in light of those reasons, courts need not apply the
same analogy and feel compelled to prohibit classwide arbitration.
23
Despite ample opportunity to follow the consolidation analogy, Jus-
115. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
116. Id. at 451.
117. Id. at 450.
118. Id. at 450-53.
119. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
120. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 84.
121. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995); Med Ctr. Cars,
Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998). But see Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192,
1208-10 (Cal. 1982) (using the consolidation analogy to support a classwide arbitration order).
122. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 86-87, wherein the author suggests that such an analogy is
"inapt" for three principal reasons:
First, the consequences of a court's refusal to order consolidation of two or more
arbitral matters are far different than the consequences of a court's refusal to allow
an arbitral matter to proceed as a class action. ...
Second, whereas a consolidation order may well cause conflict in interpreting
multiple contracts, an order for class arbitration need not ....
Third, where an arbitrator might have the power to order consolidation on his or her
own, it is not at all clear that arbitrators could properly handle class actions without
assistance from the courts.
Id.
123. See id. at 88.
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tice Breyer's opinion completely ignored any of the earlier federal
appellate decisions holding that the FAA prohibits classwide arbitration
when the agreement is silent on the issue. 124 By failing to acknowledge
these federal appellate decisions, Breyer and the rest of the plurality
neglected a golden opportunity to resolve a split among the circuits'
2 5
and several state courts which construe the FAA as allowing for consoli-
dation where the arbitration clause is silent.' 26 Instead, by vacating and
remanding upon a finding that there was "at least a strong likelihood...
that the arbitrator's decision [to conduct classwide arbitration] reflected
a court's interpretation of the contracts," the plurality opened the door to
a troubling outcome should the main dissent be adopted later.'
2 7
Justice Stevens' conclusion, that nothing in the FAA prevents a
state court from holding "as a matter of state law that class-action arbi-
trations are permissible if not prohibited by the applicable arbitration
agreement, and that the agreement between these parties is silent on the
issue," appears to suggest that he believes the court, rather than the arbi-
trator, should determine whether a particular agreement allows for class-
wide arbitration.' 28 However, it does nothing to dispel the troubling
implications suggested by the Chief Justice's dissent.' 29 On the other
hand, Justice Stevens went on to say that "[a]rguably, the interpretation
of the parties' agreement should have been made in the first instance by
the arbitrator, rather than the court."13 Unfortunately, lacking a major-
ity position, the case resolves nothing.' 3 '
124. See, e.g., Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prods. Co., 189 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999);
Champ, 55 F.3d at 275; Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.P.A. v. M/V Allegra, 198
F.3d 473, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1999); Gov't of United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F. 2d 68, 74 (2d
Cir. 1993); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991), aff'g, 761 F.
Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d
281 (11 th Cir. 1989); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.
1987); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas
Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. Compare note 124 and accompanying text, with New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1988), and Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the
Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IowA L. REv. 473, 495-502 (1987)
(arguing that even absent explicit contractual authorization, courts should be allowed to order
consolidation of various arbitral disputes).
126. See, e.g., Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208, 219-20 (Md. 1981);
Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 558 P.2d 517, 523-24 (Nev. 1976).
127. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003).
128. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
129. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chief Justice's
dissenting opinion and its possible implications.
130. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
131. Should Justice Stevens side with the dissent when the court squarely reaches the issue, it
appears that Justice Thomas's vote would be decisive. However, Justice Thomas would probably
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Undoubtedly, the Court had no intention of making classwide arbi-
tration any murkier;1 32 however, under the guise of deferring the deci-
sion to the arbitrator, this is exactly what the Court accomplishes. By
avoiding the important question of whether the FAA requires enforce-
ment of an arbitration clause forbidding classwide arbitration, the Court
leaves the issue unsettled in the face of divergent lower court deci-
sions. 133  Due to such divergence, the Court will unlikely be able to
avoid the question for long.
If this is in fact the case, then what does the Bazzle opinion tell us
to expect? The Court's view of the proper outcome was badly splin-
tered, and the Chief Justice's dissent sends a troubling signal by sug-
gesting that he and at least two other Justices are willing to grant the
FAA an unprecedented preemptive effect by exalting strict enforcement
of arbitration agreements over adherence to state contract law.1 34 He
argued that whether the agreement permitted class arbitration was a
decision for the court because the issue was what should be submitted to
the arbitrator, traditionally a matter left for the judiciary.1 35  Rehnquist
based his argument on the preemption doctrine, reasoning that state con-
tract law would be preempted if it conflicted with the congressional pur-
only address the question if it were to arise in a federal court, as his dissent reiterates his long-
standing position that the FAA should not apply to proceedings in state courts. Id. at 460
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. The issue of classwide arbitration, despite its importance, has received relatively little
attention from the courts, Congress, and even scholars in the area. As is addressed in this article,
the FAA fails to mention classwide arbitration, and the few law review articles that do address the
topic are outdated. See Stemlight, supra note 3, at 15-16.
133. Decisions in lower courts enforcing arbitration "agreements" barring class treatment:
Arellano v. Household Fin. Corp. III, No. 01 C 2433, 2002 WL 221604, at *5 (N.D. I11. Feb. 13,
2002) (holding that Truth in Lending Act reference to class actions did not convey a right to bring
class claims where such claims were not arbitrable under the "agreement"); Marzek v. Mori Milk
& Ice Cream Co., No. 01 C 6561, 2002 WL 226761 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (finding that FLSA
provision allowing collective action did not necessarily convey a right to bring a class action).
Decisions refusing to enforce arbitration "agreements" barring class treatment: Ting v. AT & T,
182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding in a consumer case that a customer service
agreement was void under public policy by violating the plaintiffs' rights to bring a class action
under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 01-
545(JRTFLN), 2002 WL 100391 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (FLSA action).
Applying that case by case principle to the facts of this case, the Court finds that the
inability to proceed collectively, particularly when considered in connection with
the venue and other provisions discussed above, has the effect of rendering
plaintiffs individual claims impractical to pursue. The right to proceed collectively
is particularly critical to these plaintiffs, who, as previously mentioned, have
relatively small individual claims.
Id. at *7.
134. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 456 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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pose behind the FAA,'3 6 thus ensuring that arbitration agreements are
enforced according to their terms.' 37 Because the agreement was that all
disputes would be decided "by one arbitrator selected by [Green Tree]
with the consent of [the claimants],"' 38 any classwide arbitration would
be inconsistent with the terms of the agreement, as Green Tree would
only be able to select the arbitrator for the class, not for each claim.'
Thus, the Chief Justice concluded that the FAA's mandate of enforcing
arbitration agreements as written 40 would preempt the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court.' 4 '
When the time comes for the United States Supreme Court to
address the question of whether the FAA permits arbitration clauses to
foreclose classwide arbitration even when they are silent on the issue,
there are a plethora of reasons the court should hold that the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration"' 42 is consistent with a state contract
law determination that such a clause is unenforceable. To begin with,
the central provision of the FAA mandates that arbitration agreements
are only enforceable to the extent that any contract would be enforcea-
ble.' 43 The Court has interpreted this so-called saving clause provision
to mean that "generally applicable contract defenses ... may be applied
to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening" the FAA.' 4 4
Therefore, congressional intent illustrates that arbitration agreements are
"as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."' 45 Thus, if a state
court determines an arbitration clause prohibiting classwide arbitration,
or remaining silent in that regard, unconscionable or unenforceable for
any number of reasons, the FAA should have no preemptive effect on
such a judgment. Further, in light of the Supreme Court's repeated def-
erence to the aforementioned saving clause, the federal policy concern-
ing the FAA's treatment of silent or prohibitive arbitration clauses on
the issue of classwide arbitration should be understood to enforce such
agreements according to their terms insofar as they comport with appli-
cable state contract law. 146
136. Id. at 458 ("'[Sltate law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law.' ")(quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989)).
137. Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995)
(quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479)).
138. Id. at 458 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
141. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
143. See 9 U.S.C. §2 (2000).
144. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
145. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
146. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 105.
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Traditional contract law provides only one reason why the Supreme
Court should abstain from construing silent arbitration agreements as
foreclosing classwide arbitration under the FAA. The liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism mandates
that ambiguous agreements be read to favor arbitration.147 In permitting
arbitrators to award punitive damages when the agreement was ambigu-
ous on the subject, the Supreme Court relied on the "common-law rule
of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous lan-
guage against the interest of the party that drafted it."' 48 Thus, drafters
(typically companies) of ambiguous agreements as to the issue of class-
wide arbitration should have the contract construed against their wishes
in the event of a dispute, permitting the claimant (typically a consumer)
to arbitrate on a classwide basis.
Additionally, as a pure matter of policy, class actions seem to have
carved out a favorable niche in federal law. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically permit them.' 49 Further, the importance of class
actions in social reform cannot be denied.15 0 Lastly, the argument that
classwide arbitration detracts from arbitration's "benefits," specifically
lower expenses and quicker adjudication, is logically flawed. Classwide
arbitration may do just the opposite and be less costly and time consum-
ing due to the adjudication of many similar claims at once.
One should recognize that despite the power of the above argu-
ments, arbitration clauses that are silent on the issue of classwide arbitra-
tion are likely to become rare as drafters simply need to create a clause
explicitly prohibiting classwide arbitration to avoid the Bazzle hold-
ing.15' The question of how the Court should deal with those agree-
ments that specifically prohibit class proceedings in any forum, judicial
or arbitral, is more problematic. 152 As companies begin to draft agree-
ments taking this form 53 and argue that they must be enforced accord-
147. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
148. See id.
149. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
150. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text; see also Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 29, 45-55 (1998).
15 1. See Dunham, supra note 1, at 141 (arguing that "[flranchisors with an arbitration clause in
their franchise agreements have an effective tool for managing these new class action risks").
152. Several courts have taken the approach that when an arbitration clause is interpreted as
precluding classwide arbitration, the claimants should be allowed to pursue their claims in class
action litigation. See Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995);
Olde Disc. Corp. v. Hubbard, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Kan. 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 879 (10th Cir.
1999).
153. One such agreement was drafted by Blockbuster, Inc. to govern the use of a
BLOCKBUSTER GiftCard® and specifically states:
To fairly resolve any dispute arising between you and Blockbuster regarding your
purchase or use of this GiftCard, you and Blockbuster agree that any claims by
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ing to their terms, courts are left with little room to maneuver. Limits
are necessary, but an all-out ban may be impracticable.' 54 The Supreme
Court will soon be confronted with issues central to the future of the
boilerplate adhesive arbitration clause as drafters begin to explicitly pro-
hibit class arbitrations. Of course, Congress could be lobbied to amend
the FAA to require enforcement of arbitration clauses eliminating class
proceedings. However, despite the Chief Justice's view to the contrary,
the FAA in its current form simply does not have such a preemptive
effect.
IV. CONCLUSION
As arbitration meets the class action there is an opportunity to real-
ize the benefits of both mechanisms in a single proceeding. The
Supreme Court's avoidance of the question of whether the FAA allows
classwide arbitration in Bazzle clouds the future for claimants seeking to
vindicate their rights on a classwide basis. Companies should not be
permitted to limit the substantive rights of consumers by imposing adhe-
sive arbitration agreements that eliminate classwide arbitration. This is
an essential step in the preservation of consumer rights and if it is not
recognized by the courts, Congress should legislate to protect such an
important procedural device that has achieved social reform on a large
scale. By leaving one stone unturned, the Supreme Court's decision in
Bazzle fails to articulate a constant theory as to when classwide arbitra-
tion is permissible under the FAA.
GREG KILBY*
either you or Blockbuster shall be settled exclusively by binding arbitration
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and administered by the American
Arbitration Association under its rules for the resolution of consumer-related
disputes, or under other mutually-agreed procedures. Because this method of
dispute resolution is personal, individual, and provides the exclusive method for
resolving such disputes, you further agree that you will not participate in a class
action or class-wide arbitration for any claims covered by this agreement. Your use
of this BLOCKBUSTER GiftCard constitutes your acceptance of this arbitration
agreement.
Blockbuster, Movies, Giftcards, Terms, at http://www.blockbuster.com/corporate/displayTerms
andConditions.action#giftcards (last updated Apr. 30, 2005) (emphasis added).
154. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 92-100 (illustrating statutory and legislative intent
arguments for invalidating arbitration agreements that specifically forbid class proceedings).
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